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Abstract: 
Click fraud is a substantial threat in the cyberworld. Here, the author examines the contexts, mechanisms, and 
processes associated with the click-fraud industry from an economics viewpoint. The nature of electronic 
channels, characterized by asymmetric hypermediation, provides a fertile ground for such fraud.  
 
Click fraud is arguably the cyberworld's biggest scam. Illegitimate clicks on pay-per-click (PPC) advertisements 
have rekindled debate about online advertising's effectiveness. Cybercriminals involved in diverse activities are 
expanding their operations into lucrative businesses in the PPC industry. At the heart of the click-fraud problem 
is the fact that site owners benefit from clicks made to ads on their sites. Search engine network partners, 
competitors, and unhappy employees can all generate illegitimate clicks. Here, I examine the contexts, 
mechanisms, and processes associated with the click-fraud industry from an economics viewpoint.  
 
Article: 
Clicks and Value Creation in the Internet Economy 
As an advertising medium, one fascinating character of the Internet stems from its measurability and instant 
feedback. In this regard, the basic idea behind the PPC model is simple: from a marketer's standpoint, a genuine 
click represents the clicker's choice, which provides an opportunity to create and deliver value. 
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 Businesses are 
understandably willing to invest in generating genuine clicks.  
 
However, the Internet's measurability, which is a driving force behind PPC advertising's growth, is more 
complicated than first meets the eye. As Table 1 presents, a click doesn't necessarily add value because not all 
clicks represent clickers' interest in the product or service. On the other hand, not all clicks need be paid to 
create value. In this article, I focus mainly on fake and invalid clicks (cells 3 and 4 in the table), but looking at 
the other types of clicks should help us better understand the click-fraud phenomenon.  
 
Table 1. Click and value creation in the Internet economy.  
 
 
Positive Value, Paid by Advertisers 
A genuine click on a paid ad, which represents the clicker's choice and lets the advertiser create and deliver 
value, falls in cell 1. Some companies have followed a different but related approach, which entails paying to 
create consumer-generated content. A Business Week article reported that China's public relations firms, such as 
Daqi.com, Chinese Web Union, and CIC, charge US$500 to $25,000 monthly to monitor online posts and help 
minimize the impact of negative information and create positive brand value for the company (June 2008; 
http://tinyurl.com/3nopkd). According to the article, some reports say these firms hire students to write good 
posts about certain brands and criticize the competition. Critics are concerned about manipulation of paid 
consumer reviews.  
 
Positive Value, Free to Businesses 
Traffic to unpaid consumer-generated content can result in sales leads businesses don't need to pay for (cell 2). 
1
 
Many businesses create and manage free networking sites, forums, and blogs to attract consumers. User-
generated content, product reviews, and word of mouth are shaping consumers' perceptions and displacing 
traditional media. A Marketing News article observed that roughly a third of the top 300 retail websites offer 
consumer-generated reviews. 
2
  
 
No Value, Charged to Advertisers 
Illegitimate clicks on PPC ads, for which advertisers get charged, fall in cell 3. Fraudsters use human and 
technological means to generate artificial clicks. Some publishers click on ads on their own websites, others pay 
a third party to do so, and still more use automated click-generating programs. As The Washington Post 
reported, click-exchange programs and forums exist to let site publishers exchange click-fraud tips (October 
2006; http://tinyurl.com/ykksde). These fraudulent clicks arise from users' malicious intent to make advertisers 
pay, which raises questions about how infallible the Internet's measurability really is.  
 
No Value, Advertisers Aren't Charged 
PPC providers have developed techniques to detect fake clicks that provide no value, for which they don't 
charge advertisers (cell 4). A Los Angeles Times article explained that Google launched a feature that let 
advertisers see invalid clicks the company had detected (August 2006; http://tinyurl.com/27t24b9). Likewise, a 
B&T Weekly article 
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 and a Fortune article (August 2006; http://tinyurl.com/28zbyss) reported that Yahoo's 
software could identify click fraud, allowing it to delete invalid click charges from advertisers' PPC accounts.  
 
Advertisers and search providers differ widely in their assessment of how many clicks fall into cells 3 and 4. 
PPC providers such as Google maintain that invalid clicks that it doesn't proactively detect (cell 3) account for 
less than 0.02 percent of total clicks. 
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 Advertisers such as Cars.com, Expedia, LendingTree, PepsiCo, Hewlett-
Packard, and Kimberly-Clark believe that the proportion of undetected fraudulent clicks is higher and argue that 
PPC providers' secretive techniques to detect invalid clicks purposely keep them in the dark. Google, for 
instance, gives advertisers aggregated statistics but no information about whether it identified a particular click 
as valid or invalid.  
 
A Survey of PPC Advertising and Click Fraud 
According to searchenginewatch.com, Internet users worldwide conducted 61 billion searches per month in 
2007 (October 2007; http://searchenginewatch.com/3627304), and MediaPost reported that in December 2008, 
Americans conducted 12.7 billion online searches (February 2009; http://tinyurl.com/cu7y7r). Businesses are 
gearing up to respond to this surge: the October 2006 Washington Post article noted that 40 percent of all 
Internet ads belonged in the PPC category. Estimates suggest that the proportion grew to 52 percent in 2007 and 
57 percent in 2008. 
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 PPC was the only form of Internet advertising that grew in 2008. AuctionBytes.com 
reported that in 2006, advertisers worldwide spent US$15 billion on PPC advertising (April 2007; 
http://tinyurl.com/26w96av), and Emarketer estimated that US businesses spent US$12.3 billion on such 
advertising in 2009. 
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This increase in PPC advertising has implications for trends in click fraud. Table 2 presents some click-fraud 
indicators. Data from other available surveys don't differ significantly from the ones provided in the table. 
However, various security and consulting companies (listed in the second column) conducted these studies and 
could have vested interests in exaggerating the risks involved with click fraud. Fraudulent clicks as a proportion 
of total clicks (third column) are substantial and exhibit a somewhat increasing trend.  
 
 
Table 2. Click-fraud-related indicators.  
 
 
Studies vary as to the problem's size because methodological, logical, conceptual, and statistical problems make 
the proportion of fraudulent clicks difficult to quantify. Most academics and consultants estimate that 10 to 20 
percent of ad clicks are fake (see Table 2 ). Anecdotal data related to companies' experiences also illustrate this 
problem. Click fraud represented 20 percent of NewCars.com's ad spending on Yahoo in 2007. 
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Estimates (for example, from informationweek.com [April 2006; http://tinyurl.com/2cxgkm8] and 
webpronews.com [July 2006; http://tinyurl.com/24wgk3j]) suggest that the US and Canada account for 90 
percent of click-fraud activities. Some surveys have reported the top click-fraud originating countries outside 
North America, which are listed in the fourth column of Table 2 . A review of articles published in outlets such 
as imediaconnection.com (October 2006; http://tinyurl.com/2brjnfb), Business Week (October 2006; 
http://tinyurl.com/nfmgzs), Marketing Magazine, The Spectator, 
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 the Botswanian daily newspaper, Mmegi, 
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the Indian national newspaper, Times of India (May 2004; http://tinyurl.com/2ka5g), and The New York Times 
(May 2009; http://tinyurl.com/r76pb4) suggests that networks of human clickers engaged in click fraud operate 
from South Africa, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Egypt, the Ukraine and other former Soviet Union economies, 
Botswana, Mongolia, Vietnam, Honduras, Indonesia, Syria, and others. California-based Cars.com reported that 
a large number of clicks on its ads came from Bulgaria, Indonesia, and the Czech Republic, where the company 
had no businesses. 
4
  
 
Some website owners have reportedly formed international networks to click on ads on each other's sites. The 
Washington Post article from October 2006 claimed that one such network, Mutualhits.com, had more than 
2,000 members. Click fraud is also associated with and facilitated by parked sites, which have little or no 
content except for ads that search providers supply.  
 
Click fraudsters mostly target businesses in the US and other industrialized countries. However, click fraud's 
footprints are getting bigger. According to Chosun, a South Korean newspaper, South Korea experienced more 
than 134 million cases of click fraud in the first three quarters of 2006, and fraud accounted for 11 percent of 
clicks on ads from Overture Korea, a commercial search service. 
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 Likewise, the market research firm 
Analysys's 2006 survey in China indicated that one-third of respondents believed they'd been click-fraud 
victims (see http://tinyurl.com/nfmgzs).  
 
Many legitimate actors are knowingly or unknowingly tied to click fraud. According to an article in The 
Guardian, advertisers paid more than US$1 billion for spyware placements in 2004 (January 2007; 
http://tinyurl.com/2bntrem). In 2007, a New Zealand-based hacker admitted his involvement in secretly 
installing the Dutch company ECS International's adware on computers; a New Zealand Herald article noted 
that the hacker earned more than US$36,000 for this work (April 2008; http://tinyurl.com/29dalwp). Likewise, 
securityfocus.com reported in 2006 that a bot-herder group in California earned more than US$100,000 in 
affiliate advertising ( www.securityfocus.com/brief/204).  
 
 
Click-Fraud Detection 
Detecting click fraud is a conceptually challenging task. We can classify invalid click-detection methods under 
three categories. 
 
The anomaly-based (or deviation-from-the-norm-based) approach considers invalid clicks to be those that 
deviate significantly from normal predicted behaviors. It involves analyzing offline aggregate data related to 
day-to-day activities to capture normal behaviors and derive a model. Instead of defining an invalid click, this 
approach defines a normal click and determines whether other clicks vary widely from the normal one. 
Challenges associated with this approach include determining what comprises normal and how much deviation 
is significant.  
 
The rule-based approach uses heuristics to classify valid and invalid clicks on the basis of specific conditions. 
For instance, if two successive clicks occur, the second click might be an invalid one. PPC providers can 
implement session tracking to track a series of requests from the same user across a given period. Alexander 
Tuzhilin maintains that if a rule considers a click to be valid, then the click is justifiable if the rule demonstrates 
that it can occur by means that aren't prohibited 
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 (for example, the click wasn't generated using bots or a 
publisher didn't click on Google's ads on his or her own website) or has a positive probability of conversion (see 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/pdf/Tuzhilin_Report.pdf).  
 
Finally, the classifier-based approach is purely operational and employs data mining classifier labels to detect 
invalid clicks. This approach is based on the assumption that past clicking behaviors predict future clicking 
behaviors. It carries out this labeling on the basis of past data about valid and invalid clicking activities. The 
approach assumes that an advertiser has past data, which classifies a click as valid or invalid with a certain level 
of confidence and doesn't consider the properties of valid or invalid clicks discussed in the previous approaches.  
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Let's next look at a cost-benefit analysis for a click fraudster, a PPC provider, and an advertiser. These benefits 
and costs can be either immediate or delayed.  
 
The Click Fraudster 
Economists consider financial as well as nonfinancial or psychic costs and benefits to analyze individuals' 
propensity to engage in criminal activities. For a click fraudster, benefits might include monetary gain and 
returns as well as psychic benefits such as enjoyment. Monetary and psychic costs are functions of the 
probabilities associated with fraud detection, fines, arrest, and conviction. Psychic costs include guilty feelings 
or other emotional penalties, which are separate from the risks of arrest and conviction.  
 
The PPC Provider 
A PPC provider's revenue is directly related to the amount of PPC advertising sold. As mentioned previously, 
online advertising providers don't charge advertisers for clicks that the providers identify as invalid via their 
detection systems. So, those providers directly benefit from valid clicks and might have a vested interest in 
labeling more clicks as valid ones. In the short run, PPC providers such as Google and Yahoo benefit from the 
fraud their affiliates commit. However, if a provider is associated with fraud, it might suffer a decline in 
reputation and bear a cost in the form of fewer opportunities to serve advertisers in the future.  
 
The Advertiser 
An advertiser likes to receive high-quality clicks on its ads for the lowest cost. We can explain advertisers' 
difficulties in benefiting from Internet ads' measurability in terms of behavioral and technological factors. The 
first problem is the imperfect relationship between click-through rates and conversion rates. That is, a website 
visitor who clicked on an ad doesn't necessarily buy the advertised product. The second problem concerns a lack 
of built-in mechanisms to protect advertisers against click fraud. Such mechanisms count in the advertiser's 
cost-benefit analysis, so losses occur due to clicks on ads that have zero probability of conversion to a buyer.  
From the advertiser's perspective, a cost-benefit analysis associated with preventing click fraud involves 
determining the optimum investment and types of measures. 
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 For small companies, identifying fraudulent 
clicks is a challenge. According to an Inc magazine article, tools such as Click Lab, Click Defense, and Click 
Detective, which are available to identify fake clicks, cost up to several thousand dollars per month. 
10
 Click 
fraud is painful for small businesses, which are overwhelmed by marketing budgets and are forced to accept 
fraudulent clicks as a cost of doing business.  
 
How Electronic Channels Affect Click-Fraud Economics 
Cyberspace is huge. From the standpoint of criminal groups, it's attractive in part because it's characterized by 
less governance and weak rule of law. Electronic channels are thus susceptible to higher opportunism, which 
increases the possibility that a potential seller will use deception to deliberately create an information 
advantage.  
 
To understand the real and perceived costs and benefits for various parties, we might want to distinguish 
technological information from market information. According to Machlup, technological information refers to 
"knowledge of the technology of the time" (Internet ad effectiveness and conversion rate) and market 
information is "knowledge of the markets" (for instance, various players involved in the PPC value chain and 
their reputation levels). 
11
 We can frame this distinction as opportunities for production and opportunities for 
exchange. 
12
  
 
This limitation of electronic channels, which is related to the absolute level of information about product quality 
(quality of clicks on an online ad, such as effectiveness and conversion), is referred to as technological 
uncertainty. This type of uncertainty results from the complexity of quality measurement and individuals' 
bounded rationality. That is, due to cognitive limitations, individuals might have difficulty assessing and 
interpreting the quality of products and services offered online. Most online advertisers might accept this 
unmeasurable quality related to technological uncertainty as "fate" or the "state of things." 
12
 The problem here 
is one of information distribution as regards product quality, in which potential traders (such as an advertiser or 
Google and Adsense website owners) possess different levels of information about click authenticity. The 
quality uncertainty issue in click fraud is more concerned with market uncertainty than technological 
uncertainty. The PPC advertising industry thus suffers from George Akerlof's "lemons problem," 
13
 which 
concerns buyers' inability to distinguish between honest and dishonest sellers or between low- and high-quality 
goods and increases the potential for adverse selection, moral hazard, and fraud. That is, advertisers can't 
determine if the PPC provider, subdistributors, or affiliates are lying, cheating, or acting dishonestly.  
 
Reputation and External Visibility 
Click-fraud rates vary across ads from various search providers. For instance, as Table 2 shows, click-fraud 
rates for Tier 1 search providers (such as Yahoo and Google) are lower than those for Tier 2 (for example, Ask, 
MSN, or Lycos) and Tier 3 providers (Dogpile). Despite higher click-fraud rates, some advertisers use Tier 2 or 
3 providers because they're cheaper. According to an Economist article, Google handles more than 75 percent of 
search-related ads in the US. 
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 It also offers advertisers three choices: Google.com only, Google.com and major 
search partners such as AOL and AskJeeves, and Google.com and the network of its affiliates. According to the 
July 2006 webpronews.com article, click-fraud rates were the highest in the third case and the lowest in the 
first. Likewise, a study by China IntelliConsulting found that China's search engine, Baidu, had a click-fraud 
rate of 34 percent compared to Google's 24 percent in that country. In 2006, a Beijing hospital claimed that 
Baidu directed a scheme in which one of its affiliates generated fake clicks on the hospital's ads.  
 
In e-commerce, barriers to entry are low, which lets buyers and sellers of all sizes and reputation levels 
participate. One reason behind higher click-fraud rates for ads distributed by smaller search providers, 
distributors, and affiliates could be that these providers are less likely to be in the media spotlight. To examine 
firms' differential tendency to engage in and respond to potentially demeaning and reputation-damaging 
activities such as click fraud, it helps to consider the stigmatization process. A central concept here is arbiters: 
Batia Wiesenfeld and her colleagues argue that the actions of social, legal, and economic arbiters influence the 
stigmatization process. 
15
  
 
Media reports serve as an intermediary affecting the market audience's perceptions about a firm's scandalous 
behaviors. The extent to which arbiters and other external actors criticize, devalue, or question a firm following 
a reputation-damaging event is a function of the firm's external visibility and reputation. 
16
 Moreover, costs 
associated with lost reputation are higher for reputed firms.  
 
Search providers with greater external visibility have directed some anti-click-fraud efforts. The August 2006 
Fortune magazine article mentioned previously reported that Yahoo developed a technology for collecting 
"traces" of Internet users' paths. To maintain and protect their reputations, PPC providers have sought legal 
recourse against click fraudsters. As covered in The Washington Post (April 2005; http://tinyurl.com/2crrn7u) 
and other sources, in 2004, Google filed a lawsuit against Auctions Expert International, a Texas-based Internet 
company. Likewise, E-Commerce Times (June 2009; www.ecommercetimes.com/story/67353.html) and other 
sources reported that in June 2009, Microsoft filed a lawsuit against three Canadians over click fraud.  
 
Hypermediation and Click Fraud 
A central feature of the Internet economy is near-zero transaction costs. An emerging body of literature asserts 
that business is undergoing hypermediation as opposed to disintermediation. 
11
 New intermediaries have 
emerged to provide various services. Click fraud's roots lie partly in hypermediation, or an increase in the 
number of subdistributors. PPC providers don't normally disclose their chain of intermediaries, and identifying 
them from the outside is difficult. To understand hypermediation-led click fraud, consider this detail: it was 
reported in 2006 that a Vonage ad passed through eight subdistributors and was illegally downloaded to users' 
PCs. 
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 Likewise, a Business Week article suggested that a Dell ad that Yahoo carried in 2005 was sent to 
InfoSpace, which then delivered it to Direct Revenue, which put the ad in a pop-up (July 2006; 
http://tinyurl.com/2b3r5hv).  
 
PPC syndication networks are intermediaries that match advertisers with a relevant audience. In some cases, 
such networks are a better match than search engine results pages and provide high conversion rates at a low 
cost. Hypermediation, however, has acted as a fraud generator by bringing potential click fraudsters into the 
value chain. PPC syndication networks consist of players with different sizes, reputations, and external 
visibility. A USA Today article pointed out that, in 2005, Google's AdSense program had roughly 200,000 
bloggers, small businesses, and other websites enrolled (March 2005; http://tinyurl.com/267cspg). Following 
the logic from the previous section, we can argue that small subdistributors and Adsense affiliates, which have 
low external visibility and reputation, are more likely to engage in click-fraud-related activities.  
 
A Click Fraudster's Strategic Elements 
I noted earlier that site owners can benefit from clicks made to ads on their sites. In addition, economic and 
psychic benefits are associated with wasting a competitor's advertising budget. An article in Marketing 
explained that how some illegitimate clicks are funded wastes competitors' ad budgets (July 2006; 
http://tinyurl.com/2av7haj). ITWire magazine reported on arrests related to such frauds (November 2008; 
www.itwire.com/content/view/21990/53/).  
 
Businesses usually have limits on how much they'll spend on PPC advertising. Once they reach these limits, 
search engines stop displaying their ads. Pushing competitors' links off search sites would help fraudsters' ads 
receive higher priority. Such frauds mainly victimize small businesses with limited budgets, and some 
fraudsters benefit psychically from wasting a competitor's budget. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as 
enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation. 
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 A CNET News article commented on one chief executive of a 
marketing company who found clicking on competitors' ads to be "an entertainment" (July 2004; 
http://tinyurl.com/peoal5).  
 
Many companies have reported victimization from competitor-generated bogus clicks on their ads. The 
Washington Post's April 2005 story explained how competitors repeatedly clicked Atlanta-based insurance 
company MostChoice.com's ads, and, in the previously mentioned Inc magazine article, 
10
 Karaoke Star 
complained that one of its competitors employed automated programs to target the company and other Karaoke 
stores. Similarly, the January 2006 issue of Wired reported that more than 40 percent of clicks to the Miami-
based JetNetwork's online ads came from a single IP address belonging to a rival ( 
www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.01/fraud.html).  
 
Economic Geography: Locations of Click-Fraud Operations 
It's tempting to employ low-wage workers from developing countries to generate clicks on ads and collect 
commission from PPC programs. The May 2004 indiatimes.com article reported that housewives, college 
graduates, and professionals in India make US$100 to $200 a month by clicking on Internet ads.  
 
When a PPC engine or advertiser deploys invalid-click detection methods, however, employing low-wage 
workers becomes less attractive. Such workers face an entry barrier if advertisers and PPC engines activate 
fraud-detection tools such as IP address filtering, geo-targeting, or monitoring traffic generated from unusual 
locations. For instance, according to Chosun, Overture South Korea's "continental cut-off" services block clicks 
from Africa. 
19
  
 
The online advertising industry's size is positively related to the attractiveness of click-fraud activities targeting 
a country. Unsurprisingly, suppliers pay more for adware installs on a US computer compared to those in other 
countries. ECS International reportedly paid US$0.30 for each install in the US, whereas the rates for non-US 
machines were $0.20 for Canada, $0.10 for the UK, and $0.01 to 0.02 in most other countries. 
20
  
 
Labor vs. Technology and Technological Economies of Scope 
Click fraudsters must often decide whether to employ the seemingly bottomless source of human clickers in 
developing countries or use technology. Some analysts assert that click-fraud-enabling technologies are 
growing more rapidly than anti-click-fraud ones developed according to advertisers' reactive decisions. A PC 
World article quoted a Cisco Secure Consulting Services manager: "Once you build a better mousetrap, hackers 
build better mice" (July 2001; http://tinyurl.com/2ak4t7o). Additionally, Botnet-generated clicks come from 
large numbers of geographically distributed computers with unique IP addresses. Algorithms that PPC providers 
and third-party auditors use to look for unusual traffic patterns might thus fail to identify such clicks.  
 
Cybercriminals have many ways of tricking unsuspecting Internet users. For instance, consumers are duped by 
free software, games, and pornography. Easycracks.net, an Armenian company, lures consumers by offering 
free, unauthorized downloads of Windows XP and games, but requires that consumers install ECS 
International's ActiveX controls. When users approve the installation, Easycracks.net causes 16 pieces of 
adware to download to their computers without permission and deliver five pop-up ads per minute. 
17
  
 
Economies of scope exist if a malicious technology is used for multiple activities. Botnets, for example, are 
used for mass spam distribution, key-logging, identity theft, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, phishing, and 
spyware, but cybercriminals also use them to fraudulently increase traffic to online ads and generate false 
clicks. An article published in The Register documented how the KMeth worm targeted Yahoo Messenger users 
by reportedly directing infected users to a website hosting Google AdSense ads about mesothelioma (October 
2006; http://tinyurl.com/2erocsl). Similarly, an E-Commerce Times article highlighted how online 
pornographers are turning to click fraud: Internet users are lured to click on a link when a fraudster plants a 
false impression of a naked person, which takes the user to a website to register a click (January 2006; 
http://tinyurl.com/27hjye4).  
 
Target Attractiveness  
Crime opportunity is a function of target attractiveness, which we measure via monetary or symbolic values. 
Two observations are worth making regarding click-fraud targets. First, returns for click fraud are positively 
related to the search term price. Site owners using Google's AdSense, Yahoo's Publisher Network, or other 
contextual networks earn a percentage of the PPC charge for clicks to ads on their sites. Although some search 
terms cost US$0.10 to $0.15 per click, those related to the law, medicine, finance, and travel industries are 
expensive. For instance, the Inc magazine article "So Many Clicks, So Few Sales" stated that for "D.C. Hair 
Laser Removal," maximum cost per click was US$146 in 2005. 
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 Companies that buy higher-priced search 
terms are more likely to fall victim (see Table 2 ).  
 
Second, to avoid detection, click fraudsters are more likely to target companies that buy more terms. As noted 
earlier, advertising networks and third-party auditors employ various methods to identify invalid clicks. If a 
fraudster searches a competitor's different keywords instead of a single term, the detection method, such as a 
rules-based algorithm, could label a fraudulent click as legitimate competitor analysis and research.  
 
Poorly Protected Computers and Defense Mechanism Weakness 
Click fraud has mainly victimized advertisers, but it would be erroneous to assume that they're the only victims. 
Weakness in defense mechanisms covaries positively with the likelihood of becoming a crime victim, and 
consumers are both instruments and victims of click-fraud schemes. Naive users' poorly protected computers 
are more susceptible to such schemes—their computers are infested with pop-up ads used to perform click 
fraud. An article entitled "Crimeware Pays" in IEEE Spectrum explained how the Russian website 
iFrameCash.biz exploited a Microsoft Windows security hole to distribute adware in 2005 (July 2008; 
www.spectrum.ieee.org/jul08/6375/). Microsoft patched the hole, but many computers worldwide remained 
vulnerable for a long time.  
 
Internet users in developing economies are attractive targets for botnet-generated frauds. In these economies, 
users are often connecting to the Internet for the first time in their lives and aren't security oriented. Moreover, 
security products are unaffordable or unavailable in their native languages.  
 
Institutions' Effects on Cost-Benefit Analyses 
Click fraudsters' activities fit squarely with what William Baumol called destructive entrepreneurship. 
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Baumol hypothesized that the extent of destructive entrepreneurship in a society is a function of the "relative 
payoffs" offered by the society's "rules of the game." Institutions capture these rules, which, according to Nobel 
Laureate Douglass North, include "formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of 
behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics." 
22
  
 
As Table 3 demonstrates, institutions can add financial and psychic value or costs to various actors. The first 
column shows the sources from which institutions affect actors' behaviors, the second summarizes mechanisms 
associated with each source, and the third presents some examples.  
 
Table 3. Institutional mechanisms associated with criminalizing and stigmatizing click fraud.  
 
 
 
National/State Level 
Nascent and formative sectors, such as Internet advertising, don't have a developed regulatory agency network. 
Governments are, however, adopting statutes and regulations to deal with click fraud, which would change the 
cost-benefit equation for fraudsters. Law enforcement agencies are looking more closely at click fraud and 
criminalizing associated activities. As reported in reuters.com, Priceline, Travelocity, and Cingular paid more 
than $30,000 each to New York state to settle charges that they employed secret adware that led to pop-up ads 
(January 2007; http://tinyurl.com/265e4cl). In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed 
fraud charges in 2005 against 12dailypro.com, which allegedly operated a pay-to-read advertising network ( 
http://tinyurl.com/ykksde). In 2006, a cybercrime unit led by the FBI and US Postal Inspection Service assigned 
analysts to examine how click fraud might violate federal laws ( http://tinyurl.com/nfmgzs), and, in the same 
year, a federal grand jury indicted a Pennsylvania man for operating a click-fraud network ( 
http://tinyurl.com/ykksde).  
 
Countries with weak laws provide fertile ground for click fraud. The October 2006 Business Week article 
mentioned previously discussed how the FBI took action after noticing click-fraud discussions in chat rooms, 
whereas the October 2006 Washington Post article reported that, in India, companies advertised in national 
newspapers looking for people willing to use home computers to click on ads, with no repercussions from 
authorities.  
 
Industry Group, Trade/Professional Association Level 
Trade associations perform two critical functions: interest representation and self-regulation. Associations, 
which mainly emphasize the former role, are considered pressure groups, whereas those focusing on the latter 
role are considered extensions of state power.  
 
We can explain the activities of various groups and advertiser coalitions organized around the shared interest of 
minimizing click fraud via the interest-representation role. According to Chosun, South Korean small 
businesses established the Online Advertisers Association to voice concerns about click fraud. 
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 Such a role 
involves directing efforts to mobilize discourse and pressuring PPC providers to change existing technological 
and institutional arrangements. In the US, advertisers pressured Google and Yahoo to be more accountable and 
demanded audited numbers and common measurement standards. We can consider these advertisers to be 
economic arbiters that make economic exchange-related decisions. Prior research indicates that institutional 
arrangements favor organized groups and actors compared to unorganized ones. Organized groups can thus act 
as economic arbiters more effectively.  
 
The self-regulation role describes the Click Measurement Working Group (CMWG) that the Interactive 
Advertising Bureau (IAB) launched in 2006 to create click-measurement guidelines. Members include Yahoo, 
Google, Microsoft, Ask.com, and the Media Rating Council (MRC). From a self-regulation angle, industry 
groups and trade associations such as the CMWG have codes of ethics that require members to maintain higher 
standards of conduct than the law does. The norms, informal rules, and codes can create order by relying on a 
decentralized enforcement process that penalizes noncompliance. 
22
 These activities help maintain and protect 
members' reputations.  
 
Finally, broad institutions shape interorganizational relations. According to a survey from researchinchina.com, 
search engines in China are less likely to face pressures and are arguably more lenient on click fraud (see 
http://tinyurl.com/23vffp5). One way to understand the China–US difference is to consider their experiences 
with modern capitalism. Many successful firms in mature market economies are guided by customer orientation 
and demonstrate their commitment to customer focus. Customers in these economies thus expect high-quality 
products and services and exhibit a low tolerance if businesses and suppliers don't fulfill their implicit and 
explicit commitments. In China's central plan-based economic system, economic activities obviously lacked 
customer orientation. Due to China's short history of modern capitalism, Chinese clients and customers are 
more likely to tolerate a low level of product and service quality and reliability.  
 
Organizational Level 
Some organizational-level rules have led to reduced click-fraud opportunities. Priceline.com—which, according 
to an InformationWeek article was among the top 10 spyware advertisers (October 2005; 
http://tinyurl.com/23685ea)—drafted a new adware policy aimed at stopping the company's pop-up ads that 
third-party distributors such as Claria, Direct Revenue, and eXact Advertising often place.  
 
Individual Level 
We can assess a fraudster's psychic costs in terms of guilty or remorseful feelings. Experts argue that most 
people who use computer networks unethically don't perceive their actions' ethical implications. 
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 For instance, 
many clickers in developing economies might just click on ads to make money and don't know that they're 
victimizing businesses. This is a consequence of the hypermediation effect discussed earlier.  
 
Click fraud has been an uncomfortable reality facing the search advertising industry and has posed a threat to 
this industry's growth. Click measurement's presumed infallibility is eroding due to massive click-fraud 
schemes.  
 
Many argue that anti-click-fraud actions from Yahoo and Google are only symbolic and designed to appease 
advertisers and are thus insubstantial. PPC providers' anti-click-fraud measures thus need to be driven by 
substantive considerations. Well-coordinated, well-funded campaigns can create the perception that PPC 
information is infallible, valid, and reliable and can reassure advertisers that they're effectively spending their ad 
dollars. Additionally, a third-party measurement system that can engender trust might address such concerns.  
 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, consumer-generated content might perform similar functions to paid clicks. 
Businesses could direct efforts toward harnessing the power of consumer reviews, blogs, and other forms of 
endorsement as an alternative to PPC advertising. Most often, these methods are less costly, relatively fraud 
free, and are becoming more effective.  
 
Selected CS articles and columns are also available for free at http://ComputingNow.computer.org.  
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